“My identity is defined by the commitments and identifications which provide the frame or horizon within which I can try to determine from case to case what is good, or valuable, or what ought to be done, or what I endorse or oppose. In other words, it is the horizon within which I am capable of taking a stand”I ljuset av ovanstående blir talet om nationell identitet obegripligt!
- Charles Taylor. Sources of the Self, 27
fredag, februari 10, 2012
Taylor om identitet
TV4 Göteborg om frikyrkans kris
Den senaste veckan har frikyrkans framtid debatterats i tidningen Dagen. Debatten startade med en ganska uppgiven och sorglig artikel av Sigfrid Deminger, där han överger det skepp han varit med om att styra under lång tid. Även om det finns mycket som är problematiskt med Demingers artikel, till både form och innehåll, så pekar den på något djupt problematiskt vad avser hur underhållningskulturen tenderar att tränga undan djup och allvar i gudstjänsten.
Med anledning av debatten gjorde TV4 Göteborg ett inslag med Deminger från Fiskebäcks Missionskyrka.
Med anledning av debatten gjorde TV4 Göteborg ett inslag med Deminger från Fiskebäcks Missionskyrka.
torsdag, februari 09, 2012
Otydligt vara vs. vara otydlig
"There is an old philosophers’ joke that the analytical philosopher always accuses the continental one of being insufficiently clear, while the continental philosopher accuses the analytical one of Being insufficiently."
via Ernst Blog
via Ernst Blog
tisdag, februari 07, 2012
Kan religionen rädda politiken?
“… before we can begin to think about the
normative or on-going relationship between religion and postsecular politics we
need to re-create the possibility of a genuine politics. A key, if not the key
catalyst for this is institutional religion. This is because religions,
particularly those with formal institutional structures, are one of the few
means of mobilizing people for common, public action; they present a
contradiction to the attempt to over-come, move beyond or avid politics through
either the market or management; they keep alive ultimate questions about what
it means to be human and what the good life consists of in such a way as to
re-open the need for political deliberation about what we value and why we
value it; and finally, religions are the bearers of moral notions of the person
and the good society and traditions of practice that enable resistance to
process of commodification and instrumentalization. Religious groups thereby
uphold the possibility of democratic citizenship which is itself premised on
the idea that the state and the market have limits and that persons are not
commodities but have infinite value."
måndag, februari 06, 2012
Taylor om religion och akademi
“I am not arguing some “post-modern” thesis
that we are each imprisoned in our own outlook, and can do nothing to
rationally convince each other. On the contrary, I think we can marshal arguments to induce
others to modify their judgments and (what is closely connected) to widen
their sympathies. But this task is very difficult, and what is more important, it is never
complete. We don’t just decide once and for all when we enter sociology class
to leave our “values” at the door. They don’t just enter as conscious premises
which we can discount. They continue to shape our thought at a much deeper level,
and it is only a continuing open exchange with those of different standpoints which
will help us to correct some of the distortions they engender.
For this reason we have to be aware of the ways in which an “unthought” of secularization, as well as various modes of religious belief, can bedevil the debate. There is, indeed, a powerful such unthought operative: an outlook which holds that religion must decline either (a) because it is false, and science shows this to be so; or (b) because it is increasingly irrelevant now that we can cure ringworm by drenches; or (c) because religion is based on authority, and modern societies give an increasingly important place to individual autonomy; or some combination of the above. This is strong not so much because it is widely supported in the population at large—how widely seems to vary from society to society—but because it is very strong among intellectuals and academics, even in countries like the U.S.A. where general religious practice is very high. Indeed, the exclusion/irrelevance of religion is often part of the unnoticed background of social science, history, philosophy, psychology. In fact, even unbelieving sociologists of religion often remark how their colleagues in other parts of the discipline express surprise at the attention devoted to such a marginal phenomenon. In this kind of climate, distortive judgments unconsciously engendered out of this outlook can often thrive unchallenged.”
- Charles Taylor. A Secular Age, s. 428-429
For this reason we have to be aware of the ways in which an “unthought” of secularization, as well as various modes of religious belief, can bedevil the debate. There is, indeed, a powerful such unthought operative: an outlook which holds that religion must decline either (a) because it is false, and science shows this to be so; or (b) because it is increasingly irrelevant now that we can cure ringworm by drenches; or (c) because religion is based on authority, and modern societies give an increasingly important place to individual autonomy; or some combination of the above. This is strong not so much because it is widely supported in the population at large—how widely seems to vary from society to society—but because it is very strong among intellectuals and academics, even in countries like the U.S.A. where general religious practice is very high. Indeed, the exclusion/irrelevance of religion is often part of the unnoticed background of social science, history, philosophy, psychology. In fact, even unbelieving sociologists of religion often remark how their colleagues in other parts of the discipline express surprise at the attention devoted to such a marginal phenomenon. In this kind of climate, distortive judgments unconsciously engendered out of this outlook can often thrive unchallenged.”
- Charles Taylor. A Secular Age, s. 428-429
Religionens nya synlighet i Fokus
"Attityderna i samhället och inom de religiösa grupperna är inne i en förändringsvåg. Och den största utmaningen verka ligga i hur vi ska leva med religion i ett samhälle som kanske inte var så sekulärt som vi trodde från början."- Fokus om religionens nya synlighet
lördag, februari 04, 2012
Ontologi für alle
Min gamla lärare Hans Boersma från Regent College har fått fina recensioner för sin senaste bok Heavenly Participation: The Weaving of a Sacramental Tapestry. Hans projekt kretsar kring att bryta ner barriären mellan det naturliga och det övernaturliga, mellan jord och himmel, som är så central för det moderna projektet. Boersma går tillbaka till kyrkofäderna och nouvelle théologie-teologer som deLubac, Balthasar och Chenu för att finna resurser för en teologi där det övernaturliga genomsyrar det naturliga, vad Milbank skulle kalla en "participatory ontology".
The word “ontology” may put some people on edge. The expression places us, so it seems at least, in the area of abstract, metaphysical thought. Should Christians really concern themselves with ontology? Isn’t the danger of looking at the world through an ontological lens that we may lose sight of the particularities of the Christian faith: God’s creation of the world, the Incarnation, the Crucifixion, the outpouring of the Holy Spirit, the particular ecclesia community, and Scripture itself? I understand these fears, and I appreciate the word of caution as an important one. Nonetheless, the objections do not make me abandon the search for an ontology that is compatible with the Christian faith…I believe that the Great Tradition of the church – most of the Christian ear until the late Middle Ages – did have an ontology. The call for a purely “biblical” theology seems to me terribly naïve. Whether consciously or subconsciously, we all work with a particular ontology; unfortunately, usually the ontology of those who plead for the abolition of ontology turns out to be the nominalist ontology of modernity (20).
Mixed bag
- William Cavanaugh skriver lysande om myten om "religionskrigen"och den sekulära staten som fredsmäklare: "the true historical oddity is not the 'politicization of Islam' but the 'religionization of Christianity'.
- James K.A. Smith ger en god introduktion till modernitetens och postmodernismens förhållande till religion: “Beyond A/Theism: Postmodernity and the Future of God”.
- Underhållande om lycka och produktivitet, där det "vetenskapliga" receptet påminner om de kristna dygderna.
- James K.A. Smith ger en god introduktion till modernitetens och postmodernismens förhållande till religion: “Beyond A/Theism: Postmodernity and the Future of God”.
- John Stackhouse skriver om varför Mitt Romneys mormonism är av intresse.
torsdag, februari 02, 2012
Angående historielösa analyser
"It is of course
notoriously true that, with the exception of the likes of Wilfred Sellars,
Richard Rorty and Bernard Williams, analytic philosophers are proud of their
total ignorance of the history of ideas, or the history of anything else save
things like playing cards and voting practices."
- ur John Milbanks Stanton lecture, pt1
- ur John Milbanks Stanton lecture, pt1
måndag, januari 30, 2012
Om epistemologins död
“Now, the analysis of “thought,” “reason,”
“understanding,” and so on - in general, of the cognitive, contemplative,
passive behavior of a being or a “knowing subject” - never reveals the why or
the how of the birth of the word “I,” and consequently of self-consciousness -
that is, of the human reality. The man who contemplates is “absorbed” by what
he contemplates; the “knowing subject” “loses” himself in the object that is
known. Contemplation reveals the object, not the subject. The object, and not
the subject, is what shows itself to him in and by - or better, as - the act of
knowing. The man who is “absorbed” by the object that he is contemplating can
be “brought back to himself” only by a Desire; by the desire to eat, for
example. The (conscious) Desire of a being is what constitutes that being as I
and reveals it as such by moving it to say “I….” Desire is what transforms
being, revealed to itself by itself in (true) knowledge, into an “object”
revealed to a “subject” by a subject different from the object and “opposed” to
it. It is in and by-or better still, as “his” Desire that man is formed and is
revealed-to himself and to others - as an I, as the I that is essentially
different from, and radically opposed to, the non-I. The (human) I is the I of
a Desire or of Desire.
—Alexandre Kojève: Introduction to the
Reading of Hegel, 3
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