Om vetenskapens gränser

Science by definition can provide, in principle at least, complete nomological explanations for those items that lie within its domain. But most things that require explanation lie outside the competency of science, including axiological explanations, such as why the First World War happened, why rape is wrong, why I think this painting is beautiful and you don’t, and why the economy is in such a mess. Nor will science ever explain why something exists rather than nothing, because its scope is to investigate “somethings” once they exist, be they quantum fluctuations, mathematical relationships, laws of nature, or elementary particles. The ability to provide explanations regarding things that exist is not the same as explaining why anything exists rather than nothing. 

There is nothing that science should not try to explain, provided that it seems reasonable to suppose that what needs explaining lies within the domain of science. Unfortunately, not all scientists have made that distinction, leading to a waste of time and public money, in addition bringing embarrassment to the scientific community. Care should also be taken in distinguishing between science and scientism, the idea that the scientific explanation is the only one that counts. In practice, complex systems require explanations at many different levels, only some of which count as scientific explanations. A scientific explanation of the workings of my brain cannot provide, in principle, an exhaustive explanation. The “I” language of personal agency is complementary to the “it” language of the neuroscientist, providing its own explanations for things based on qualia and conscious experience. It is the explanatory, non-science “I” language of our personal biographies that we care most deeply about.

- Denis Alexander in The New Statesman (via I Think I Believe)

John Gray om vetenskapstro

The belief that the political conflicts of the day can be resolved by applying evolutionary psychology is no more wellfounded than the claims of earlier versions of scientism that invoked phrenology or dialectical materialism. No doubt human knowledge has increased since the days when those pseudo-sciences were in the ascendant. Certainly we know a good deal more about human origins, and about the workings of the human brain, than we did then. But we are no better equipped to deal with moral and political conflict. Intellectually, we may be less well prepared than previous generations, if only because we know less of our own history.

John Gray recenserar The Righteous Mind: Why Good People are Divided by Politics and Religion
av Jonathan Haidt i The New Republic.

Rasmusson om vetenskap som ersatz religion

Christian theology may thus contribute to the desacralisation of Science, critiquing the myth of Science for the sake of both society and of the sciences themselves. As Conor Cunningham remarks, “Scientism is a massive intellectual pathology” that is destructive for a society’s moral and political thinking and practice as well as for the immensely important work of ordinary science. It is not only a matter of Lakoff and Pinker failing to deliver what they promise; for theologians, the problematic nature of their work demonstrates the need for theological critique of the uses of science and for more fruitful, albeit humble, uses of scientific work in moral and political discourse.

Arne Rasmusson, nytillträdd professor i Tro- och livsåskådningsvetenskap vid Göteborgs Universitet (dessförinnan Umeå),  skriver i senaste numret av Modern Theology om bland andra Steven Pinkers vetenskapstro och vikten av en teologisk kritik av en naiv vetenskapssyn.

Vad Hauerwas skulle sagt till Högskoleverket ...

Högskoleverkets ifrågasatte nyligen examensrätten för flera av landets teologiska utbildningar. Bland annat kritiserades att "utbildningarna har få perspektiv från andra religioner än kristendomen" och man "såg kritiskt på att det inte föreligger någon tydlig separation mellan de praktiskt kyrkligt orienterade kurserna och de rena högskolekurserna ".

Jag misstänker att nedanstående utdrag är vad Hauerwas skulle ha svarat på Högskoleverkets kritik:

Part of our problem is that the idea of objectivity, which is mistakenly assumed to be exemplified in the sciences and an elusive goal for the humanities, is a deeply flawed notion. In the name of objectivity the assumption has been underwritten that knowledge is only good insofar as that which is known is freed from any tradition of inquiry. Yet the sciences work well exactly because they exemplify a traditioned mode of inquiry which, moreover, requires the student to be capable of participating in such a tradition. If the students are to become good scientists they must be willing to have their lives transformed through that activity; they must be transformed, moreover, not simply because of the current social power of science but because of the elegance and beauty of what is discovered.

Stanley Hauerwas. “Character, Narrative, and Growth in the Christian Life,” i The Hauerwas Reader .

Med Hans Urs von Balthasars ord: Knowledge of the general must be interpreted in the light of the particular.

Eagleton om vetenskap och teologi

"The difference between science and theology, as I understand it, is one over whether you see the world as gift or not; and you cannot resolve this just by inspecting the thing, any more than you can deduce from examining a porcelain vase that it is a wedding present."

Terry Eagleton - Reason, Faith and Revolution, s. 37